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Abstract 
 
The super-rich today represent a challenge to sociological enquiry, seeing as their 
principle characteristic would appear to be strategies for divorcing themselves from 
the constraints of public institutions, discourses, identities and legal constraints. It is 
not clear that conventional theories of class or elites adequately capture the way in 
which wealth is insulated from political or public interference. Inspired by Simmel's 
account of money as a type of teleological vacuum - a sheer absence of any fixed 
purpose - this chapter considers an alternative way of conceiving of the super-rich, in 
terms of networks of 'agents' or intermediaries. It is argued that 'agents' represent an 
important constituent in the contemporary political economy of the super-rich, 
because they act on behalf of the very wealthy, so as to prevent wealth from 
becoming imbroiled in political or cultural controversies. 
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Who are the super-rich, and what do they want? Are they a new class, and if so, 
what type of class are they? One of the few things we know about them, by 
definition, is that they have very large amounts of money at their disposal, which, 
especially in the English-speaking world, has become more concentrated than at any 
time since the 1920s (Dorling, 2014; Piketty, 2014). Statistical knowledge of this 
trend has increased markedly since the global financial crisis which began in 2007, 
thanks especially to work of Piketty. But this highlights some troublesome gaps in our 
sociological understanding, which opens up a host of new empirical and theoretical 
questions. If Piketty's work leaves a great deal unexplained, one might argue that this 
is an opportunity for sociology, rather than a limitation of that particular work 
(Savage, 2014a).    
 
What do they want to do with all that money, other than protect it, grow it and pass it 
on to their children? Do they want political power, and if so, of what kind and to what 
end? Or do they employ it culturally, to achieve their own modes of Bourdieusian 
distinction from the other 99.9%? Classical theories of elites stress the overlapping 
nature of different types of power and capital, that is, the capacity to convert money 
into political power, or political power into money, or cultural capital into income 
(Mills, 1999; Savage & Williams, 2008). If the super-rich are an 'elite' in that Millsian 
sense, then we should be asking what institutions they are seeking to infiltrate, be 
they political, cultural or military. According to such a notion of elites, they will 
gravitate ultimately towards the state in some way, in search of power. Or if they are 
a 'class' in a classically Marxian sense, then we should be asking which other class 
they sit in relation to, who they are exploiting, and with what tools. This requires them 
to develop some reflexive, collective self-consciousness, to act in defense of their 
shared interests.  
 
Mike Savage has recently urged sociologists to avoid resorting to some of their 
favourite tropes when exploring and explaining the super-rich (Savage, 2014b). He 
notes that one of the few things we do know about the super-rich is that they like to 
reside and keep their wealth in a small number of urban alpha territories, dotted 
around the world. But beyond that, there are unanswered questions that should 
provide pause for thought, both methodologically and theoretically.  
 
Firstly, Savage suggests that we need to try and take money seriously as money, 
that is, we shouldn't automatically view it as something to be converted into power. 
We need, he suggests, to avoid the Weberian temptation to treat elites as 
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fundamentally political, which Mills is symptomatic of. To do this, we need to draw on 
the sociology of money, to get a handle on what wealth and income of this magnitude 
might mean and do. Secondly, we should accept the need for descriptive methods 
(such as Piketty's, or digital data-mining), rather than immediately dig in search of an 
underlying causal substrate. This means avoiding the Marxian temptation to theorise 
capital before we have adequately described it, something Piketty manifestly 
succeeds in doing, to the chagrin of some Marxist critics (Kunkel, 2014).  
 
Savage also identifies a couple of fresh theoretical challenges for sociology. One of 
these is to adequately name this class, if indeed it is a class (given that '1%' is 
somewhat misleading). If it is not a class, then we need to classify it in some other 
way, on the basis of description. Another challenge is to theorise what form of 
openness this 'class' has: it seems neither closed like an aristocracy, nor 'open' like a 
meritocracy. 
 
To these challenges, we might also add another one, which is familiar to the study of 
elites. This is the need to avoid wholesale methodological individualism, while 
recognising the deeply personal and individualised nature of the relationships and 
strategies that appear to structure the lives of the super-rich. Another of Piketty's 
challenges to sociology, Savage suggests, is to turn the focus of political economy 
upon the family, and away from the labour market. But this is tricky, methodologically 
and epistemologically. Knowledge of elites is at best partial, and therefore requires 
certain measured acts of extrapolation (Bowman et al, 2013), however the case of 
the super-rich adds further difficulties, in being actively secretive in certain respects. 
There is a risk of conspiracy theory, although there is an equal and opposite risk of 
ignoring the possibility of conspiracies. 
 
This paper responds to these challenges, and seeks to reorient elite studies in view 
of the particular problems posed by the super-rich in the early 21st century. It does 
so by foregrounding the question of intermediaries, that is, commercial agents who 
work on behalf of clients, so as to represent their public, political, cultural and 
geographic interests. As I have previously explored, intermediaries - such as 
consultants, fund managers, credit-raters and auditors - have been at the heart of the 
crisis of financial capitalism, a crisis that is as much normative (specifically, the 
normalisation of 'fraudulent' activity) as economic (deflation) (Davies, 2014a). The 
power and wealth of such intermediaries has grown substantially over recent 
decades. They carry vast responsibility for the very possibility of economic 
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knowledge and regulation, inasmuch as they perform critical work of evaluation and 
translation within highly complex spheres of financial and contractual activity. And 
yet, despite this, they have also come to be viewed in reductively economic terms, as 
private sector actors like any others, hence with less and less sense of 'vocation' 
towards the general socio-economic good. This is a dangerous situation.    
 
This chapter is in three parts. Firstly, responding partly to Savage's incitement to take 
money seriously, I put forward the hypothesis, drawing on Simmel, that the super-
rich dwell in a teleological vacuum. That is, we might want to consider that their lack 
of political project is one of their central characteristics. They desire the 'negative 
liberty' that money offers, but to a degree that goes well beyond the guarantees of 
political liberalism or neoliberalism. Hence their retreat into private space. Secondly, I 
suggest that one way we can understand this politically is via the concept of 'agency', 
as it derives from game theory and neo-classical economics. Agency is the 
phenomenon of one person being contracted to represent the interests of another, 
arising as a 'problem' with the birth of professional management in the late 19th 
century. By focusing on 'agency' as a pivotal institution or problem, we can begin to 
respond to some of the challenges that Savage outlines, without simply collapsing 
everything back into Weberian or Marxian explanations. A key reason for this is that 
'agency' relations are political, without being exploitative or hierarchical. Thirdly, I 
explore how we might view the super-rich today on this basis, and what the key 
forms of agency might be. I argue that traditional sociological classifications and 
presuppositions - such as those of 'elites' or 'class' - are not adequate for 
understanding the highly privatised, individualised types of power which agents 
facilitate. The chapter concludes by exploring the nature of the challenge this poses 
to social science today.  
 
 
Taking the teleological vacuum seriously 
 
What do the super-rich want? This is clearly an empirical question, which shouldn't 
be determined too soon. But what if, as a hypothesis, it turns out they simply want to 
be and remain super-rich? What if their identity is simply provided by their very 
wealth, rather than their capacity to convert that into power or cultural capital, or their 
capacity to accumulate it through productive exploitation? It is worth exploring the 
implications of this in terms of the nihilistic, a-teleological nature of devotion to money 
itself.  
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In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel marvels at the bizarre nature of paper money, 
both as means of exchange and as wealth. Money, as various anthropologists have 
commented, has a dual character, as both everything and nothing. It "means more to 
us than any other object of possession because it obeys us without reservation – and 
it means less to us because it lacks any content that might be appropriated beyond 
the mere form of possession" (Simmel, 2004: 325). By possessing no telos of its 
own, it is the abstract idea of all possible teleologies. It is perfectly designed to be so 
useless in itself, as to serve all other uses. Simmel argues: 
 
Money in its perfected forms is an absolute means because, on the one hand, 
it is completely teleologically determined and is not influenced by any 
determination from a different series, while on the other hand it is restricted to 
being a pure means and tool in relation to a give end, has no purpose of its 
own and functions impartially as an intermediary in the series of purposes. 
 (Simmel, 2004: 211) 
 
To value money in itself is to value as-yet unspecified, and therefore infinite, 
possibilities. The truth of money is not revealed in how it is earned or spent 
empirically, but in the having of it as such. Those who desire money itself (what he 
terms "the purest form of avarice") and live off money are in touch with its 
metaphysical quality, "namely, to extend beyond every particular use and, since it is 
the ultimate means, to realise the possibility of all values as the value of all 
possibilities" (Simmel, 2004: 221). Financial culture, Simmel suggests, is 
"characterless" (2004: 216). 
 
We know from Piketty's work that, as the ratio of public capital to private capital shifts 
further towards the latter, the role of unearned income in the economy grows. This 
raises the importance of inheritance as a source of wealth, and intergenerational 
inequalities grow more pronounced. Piketty has been accused of offering no actual 
theory of capital, nor any explanation of where it 'really' comes from; all he does is 
describe its distribution over time. But in doing so, he potentially brings Simmel's 
argument into sharper focus. Capital, defined by Piketty as anything (productive or 
otherwise) that pays a return, is a form of pure possibility, lacking any necessary 
relationship to technology, culture or politics. The vacuum at the heart of Piketty's 
work may be a representative one. This is partly what the concept of 'financialisation' 
also points towards, that financial capital has taken on a logic all of its own, which 
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has (or, at the very least, seems to have) lost all connection with production 
(Lapavtisas, 2013). The only resource on which financialisation is necessarily 
dependent on is the future.   
 
Likewise, Dorling argues that one of the most culturally and politically important 
implications of the rise of the '1%' in Britain is that traditional professional classes 
(doctors, teachers, civil servants, journalists) are no longer the beneficiaries of 
capitalist expansion, but are now becoming submerged within the rest of the '99%'. If, 
as per the Bourdieusian framework, professions are one important way in which 
capital is reproduced culturally and discursively, the fact that professional, upper 
middle class people are now experiencing economic stagnation or decline represents 
a further way in which financial capital has pulled away from everything but itself. 
Viewed more normatively, professions serve a valuable function in anchoring capital 
and knowledge in the public sphere (Perkin, 2003), hence the rise of the super-rich 
may represent a severing of capitalism's relationship to liberal, Habermasian ideals 
of inclusive public debate. Other than its relationship to urban residential property 
and the domestic sphere, money may be striving towards the Simmelian ideal, of 
being nothing but pure possibility.  
 
This casts a different light on the politics of the super-rich, if indeed it can be 
described as 'politics' at all. What is their political telos? Perhaps it is to be 
completely left alone, to remain completely outside of the realm of politics and public 
sphere, conventionally understood. Safety for themselves, their families and their 
assets appears to be one of their over-arching concerns, hence the need for family 
offices and private fund managers to work constantly on their behalf (Glucksberg, 
2014). To break free of the bounds of culture, politics or technological limits becomes 
a teleology in itself, the same anti-teleology that Simmel identified as the 
metaphysical nature of money.  
 
As Simmel implies, and Friedrich Hayek later articulated, money offers an almost-
perfect form of 'negative liberty', greater than anything that can be promised in the 
form of 'rights' (Hayek, 1944: 93). The paradox of neoliberalism, however, is that it 
has always had to promote this negative liberty through active political and legal 
means. Strict monetary policy has to become adopted by the state; markets must be 
defended and extended using sovereign powers; 'marketization' of public services is 
a policy strategy. The neoliberal can live neither with nor without the state (Peck, 
2010; Blythe, 2012). In Harvey's Marxist formulation, there is a constant contradiction 
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between the ideal and the reality of the neoliberal state, that purports to shrink, but in 
reality is required to propagate class interests, often using violence (Harvey, 2005: 
77-80). Reconfiguring society in competitive, individualistic terms also requires a 
positive vision of how freedom should be used, in addition to a negative vision of 
which restraints and soldarities need abandoning (cf. Dardot & Laval, 2014). One 
possible way of understanding the gambit of the super-rich is to overcome this 
paradox, to live wholly within the negative liberty of money, without even depending 
on the active, modernising state that has always been an indispensable tool of 
neoliberalism. If the emergence of neoliberalism was characterised by a new fusion 
of corporate and state interests, a key trait of the super-rich is to reduce their 
intimacy with the state or other public/political actors.  
 
This is not to deny that hedge fund managers and oligarchs donate to political 
parties, purchase art, or set up businesses. The Millsian vision of "overlapping 
cliques" is not entirely moribund (Mills, 2004: 18). The question is, what could the 
super-rich demand or ask of the state, other than even more negative liberty: less 
tax, less regulation, less attention from the tax collectors, fewer barriers to the 
movement of high-net-worth individuals and their assets. Neoliberalism itself has 
never been a laissez-faire ideology (Mirowski, 2009, 2013), but it is possible that the 
super-rich have now outgrown neoliberalism as a set of embedded regulatory 
techniques, at least in any public sense.  
 
Is this the end of the matter? Must we simply accept that the super-rich are a 
negative, a vacuum, some form of capitalist sublime, which wants nothing but to be 
detached from state, public and production, in accordance with the promise of money 
itself? There is a risk here of repeating some of the Hegelian exaggerations of 
globalisation theory, which suggested new entirely frictionless, 'virtual' forms of global 
space. One way of avoiding this is to recognise that, if it is to retain its negative 
character, money (and its owners) must be constantly represented via a range of 
intermediaries and agents, if it is to remain separate. Capital may no longer be 
necessarily related to the productive economy via hierarchical relations of 
exploitation, as in the Marxian framework; nor need it be embedded in political 
hierarchies of corporation and state, in a Weberian sense. But some relationship to 
the non-financial, public world is necessary, for insulation to remain intact. It is one 
thing to avoid collapsing the status of money into power, labour or culture (as Savage 
rightly warns us not to); it is quite another to suggest that capital lacks any 
relationship to these entities whatsoever. The job of keeping the super-rich insulated 
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is itself constituted by power, labour and culture, which money must be spent on. But 
how might we conceive of this relation, in ways that avoids the various pitfalls of 
sociological reductionism? 
 
 
Principle-agent problems 
 
One way to avoid sociological reductionism is to opt for description over explanation. 
Related to this is another strategy: to view the socio-economic world as structured by 
the categories of those who inhabit it, rather than the critical realist who observes it 
(Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006). An example of the latter would be Callon's claim that 
economics 'performs' economic life, which has provided the premise for an entire 
new tradition of cultural-economic sociology (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, et al, 2007). 
But arguably this is not so different from how Marx extrapolated from the categories 
of classical political economy, or how Simmel worked with the subjectivist grain of 
marginalism. Giving credence to particular elements of economics has some 
pragmatic benefits for sociological reorientation and refreshment.   
 
In this spirit, I want to propose a theoretical device which may help to shape a 
sociological approach to the super-rich - principle-agent problems. In particular, I 
suggest that we can think of the relationship of the super-rich to domains of power, 
culture and production as a series of principle-agent problems, in which they seek a 
form of representation which absolves them of the need to become involved in 
matters of public concern or controversy. Rather than a democratic representation, 
which seeks the power of voice, it is a form of delegation which secures the power of 
exit (Hirschman, 1970). Equally, it is through this phenomenon of delegation (and 
chains of delegation) that extreme concentrations in income and wealth can be partly 
understood. 
 
The notion of a principle-agent problem derives originally from game theory, with the 
paranoid methodological individualism which goes with that. Such problems arise 
where one actor (the 'principle') delegates the pursuit of their interests to another 
actor (the 'agent'). Hence, in contracting a lawyer to represent me, I am the 'principle' 
and the lawyer is the 'agent'. The primary challenge posed (at least for the game 
theorist) is how to ensure that the agent does not abuse their position to pursue their 
own private interests, which requires careful management of the agent's incentives 
(sanctions and rewards). One thing which we gain by adopting this methodologically 
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individualistic framework is the ability to look beyond the relationship of capital to 
labour, towards capital's relationship to its various managerial, cultural and political 
delegates. The principle-agent relation is not one founded in exploitation or 
hierarchy, but a negotiation which is potentially a 'win-win', as long as such a 
settlement can be found. It is a problem of mutually beneficial contract under 
conditions of uncertainty, rather than a problem of hierarchy under conditions of 
opposing interests. 
 
The area where principle-agent theory has been most influential over recent decades 
has been in corporate governance, where it has been intimately involved in the rise 
of 'shareholder value' as the organising purpose of business management (Lazonick 
& O'Sullivan, 2000). Viewed from a methodologically individualist perspective, 
corporate governance becomes a problem of how to ensure that senior managers 
act on behalf of shareholders, rather than in their own interests. The apparent 
solution is to reward managers in direct proportion to increases in stock price, in the 
hope that they then come to take decisions from the perspective of shareholders. In 
practice, executive remuneration has risen at a far greater pace than the stock 
market over the past 30 years, suggesting that the 'agency problem' of senior 
management is possibly exacerbated by viewing it via the lens of game theory, and 
that management has 'gamed' governance in their own interests.  
 
Taking a longer-term historical view of this problem, it arises initially with the birth of 
professional management in the late 19th century, especially with the problem of 
corporate executives (Chandler, 1977) As the owners of corporations became 
separate from those controlling them, a disquieting question arises: who are these 
controllers, and what do they want? Whose interests do they serve? While most 
managers can be bracketed as Weberian bureaucrats, who rise up through the ranks 
by processing rules, very senior managers have always posed more of a sociological 
riddle. As Mills himself observed, they don't fit easily into sociological categories: they 
are neither entrepreneur, nor bureaucrat; neither private owner, nor public politician 
(Mills, 1999: 133). Ultimately, they are symptoms of the deep-lying ambiguity 
surrounding the corporate form generally, which is neither a piece of private property 
nor a political association, but flips from one to the other as it suits.  
 
There are solutions to the problem of executive management, which do not require 
them to be viewed narrowly as 'agents' of financial capital. They can be trained to 
conceive of themselves as professionals, serving the public interest in some diffuse 
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sense. As Khurana has shown, the initial purpose of business schools was to grant 
corporate executives the same public legitimacy as was held by professions 
(Khurana, 2007). During the middle decades of the twentieth century (also the period 
of reduced inequality) this may have been achieved to some extent (Mizruchi, 2013). 
Yet corporate executives always face the problem that they lack any specific domain 
of knowledge to hold a monopoly over, which is the key characteristic of a profession 
(Abbott, 1988). Hence, professional public legitimacy may not even be available to 
them, and their connection to the 'public interest' is always open to renegotiation. 
 
Governance therefore depends partly on additional forms of knowledge, which aim to 
produce trust. Techniques of audit and credit-rating were initially invented to deal 
with the appearance of limited liability corporations, as entities distinct from their 
shareholders (Power, 1997). However, the latter may introduce their own problems of 
'agency', once the auditor or the rater is being paid by the company being evaluated. 
In the current climate, where accountants have been implicated in 'industrial scale' 
tax avoidance, auditors have been accused of covering up corporate fraud, credit-
raters have been complicit with 'rating shopping' (in which investment banks get their 
financial products rated by whichever agency will judge them the most approvingly), 
principle-agent problems are multiplying all over the place. The problem underlying 
all of this is one of seeking to construct a socio-political form of justification ('the 
public interest', 'trust') using only the monetary logic of the market.  
 
The point, then, is that the separation of business ownership and control in the late 
19th century produced problems for sociological analysis which are arguably similar 
and related to those currently posed by the super-rich. At precisely the same time as 
paper money was entering circulation, to produce the giddying subjectivist nihilism 
explored by Simmel, a new stratum emerged with a parallel teleological vacuum at its 
heart. Corporate executives float in a space that cannot be easily classified as 
'political', 'economic' or 'cultural'. They may sometimes seek public recognition, but 
are never successfully defined as a 'profession'. They act on behalf of others, and yet 
they are also arch delegators themselves. Mills observes that power and 
responsibility within the firm sit just below the senior executive, while the latter is 
more focused externally upon networks and other elites (1999: 135). Today, 
shareholder value commits CEOs to focus on the financial markets, which are the 
target of constant narrative manipulation and PR (Froud et al, 2006).  The 
corporation, Deleuze notes, "is a spirit, a gas", without any tangible, temporal or 
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spatial form (1992: 4). Similarly, those at the apex of corporations seem to defy 
formal categorisation.  
 
Reconfigured in sociological terms, the principle-agent problem is a particular way of 
representing the interface of politics and economics. Considered in more substantive 
and historical terms (as opposed to the mathematical formalism of game theory), a 
principle-agent problem involves the use of money to distance oneself from political 
controversy, discourse, dispute and normativity. The 'principle' pays the 'agent', such 
that the former can remain in the private realm, while the latter enters the public 
realm on the principle's behalf. Agency is therefore a precondition of radicalised 
negative freedom. Negative freedom in Isiah Berlin's sense (of 'freedom from' rather 
than 'freedom to') has traditionally been associated with the liberal philosophical 
tradition, in which the individual is the holder of rights, which are protected by public 
law (Berlin, 2002). However, the agency relationship grants a higher order of 
negative freedom, in which money is used in pursuit of a frictionless existence, 
separate even from the liberal or neoliberal constitution which preserves economic 
freedom in the first place. Normative judgement is delegated to accountants, credit-
raters and auditors; political control of labour is delegated to managers; political 
control over markets and currencies is delegated to policy-makers. In these ways, 
capital can float free of controversial situations, such as firms, critical deliberation 
and public policy. 
 
In each case, for money tor remain just money, and not become embroiled in 
broader political or cultural disputes, a certain share of it must be syphoned off and 
paid to the delegate. Keeping finance separate involves 'agents' willing to act on its 
behalf. This is true with respect to corporate governance. But the very same 
mechanism is at work in, say, contemporary 'family offices' whose principle purpose 
is to save super-rich families from having to engage in public situations (getting a 
child into a school, handling tax, booking a restaurant table, managing property) 
which may involve any form of antagonism. Where traditional professions, such as 
accountancy and law, become reconceived in these terms, this represents a 
significant sociological transformation. No longer does the 'professional' serve to 
anchor capital in the public sphere (or tie it cultural capital), but becomes the 
delegate of capital, allowing capital to float free of public commitments.  
 
Piketty argues that the rise of the super-rich since the 1970s cannot be explained in 
terms of 'super stars' or celebrities (2014: 417). Instead, he suggests that it is 
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explicable in terms of incomes of senior management, who are able to bargain 
endlessly upwards. One reason why higher marginal tax rates are deemed 
beneficial, cited by both Piketty and Dorling, is that they make this behavior less 
attractive, diverting time and competitive instincts elsewhere (such as the building of 
better companies). Incomes amongst executives are now so high, that income 
inequality is being converted directly into wealth inequality (i.e. surplus income is 
being turned into capital, to be passed onto children), whereas until the 1980s, 
inequalities in income and capital were divergent.  
 
Piketty's argument clearly reflects something about the financialisation of 
corporations (and the rise of shareholder value) since the 1970s. And yet it doesn't 
reflect on the specific ways in which executives have come to view themselves as 
the delegates of the financial markets. Boyer argues, for instance, that a symptom of 
financialisation is that the self-understanding of CEOs shifts from that of 'most senior 
wage-earner' to 'in-house representative of finance' (Boyer, 2000). Equally, how does 
this relate to the vast salaries and bonuses paid to, say, hedge fund managers, 
corporate lawyers, partners in Big Four accounting firms, star traders in investment 
banks, and so on. Just before the financial crisis struck, the number of bankers and 
traders in London earning over £1m a year was five times higher than the number of 
CEOs earning that amount (Savage & Williams, 2008). Work by CRESC suggests 
that financial 'intermediaries' make up a far greater share of the super-rich than 
senior management (Folkman et al, 2007; Erturk et al, 2007).  
 
So who is to be the central focus of sociological investigation into the super-rich - the 
corporate executive or the financial intermediary? Of course it must be both. Much 
more than that, it must include the various other intermediaries that act as 'agents' of 
capital, in its various guises. Corporate governance might be the exemplary principle-
agent problem, but delegation and intermediation extends well beyond the 
relationship between shareholder and executive. 'Ownership' of financial capital is 
itself spread through lengthy chains of intermediation, providing countless 
opportunities for what CRESC term 'value skimming' and 'value surfing' (Erturk et al, 
2007). Some forms of agency need to be considered as modes of cultural 
representation, rather than political. The agents who are discursively equipped to 
represent profits as zero, to render them untaxable; those who represent elite urban 
spaces in ways which reinforce their asset values; those who mediate between 
capital and elite restaurants, schools and art. Just as capital can employ political 
delegates to deal with hierachies, controversies and public disputes, it can employ 
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cultural delegates to circumvent the friction of discovering or reproducing symbolic 
value. The capacity to control the public language of finance is arguably one of the 
main way in which dominant financial institutions currently resist reform or political 
intervention (Haldane et al, 2012; Davies, 2014a; Chang, 2014). 
  
 
Beyond neoliberalism 
 
Classical theories and critiques of liberalism have stressed that it is a political vision 
founded on separation of institutional spheres, in a public sense. Polanyi's critique of 
liberal political economy is that it imagines a separation between state and 'free 
market', which conceals the political relations that produce the latter (Polanyi, 1957). 
One way of understanding neoliberalism is in terms of its refusal of such rhetorics 
and techniques of separation. All action is fundamentally economic action, from a 
neoliberal perspective, therefore state and society need to be constantly audited 
using techniques borrowed from the market such as cost-benefit analysis, 'return on 
social investment' and competitiveness evaluation.  
 
Yet neoliberalism's central paradox is that it remains a public, political project: an 
effort to reinvent the state using techniques and theories which have no concept of 
public, authority or sovereignty (Davies, 2014b). Harvey details the various 
authoritarian, punitive, regulatory and modernising activities that the neoliberal state 
has engaged in since the 1970s, to ensure that the balance of political power is 
tipped in favour and against labour (Harvey, 2005). This produces the contradiction 
between the rhetoric of 'freedom' and the practice of authoritarianism. Today, the 
neoliberal project continues to advance in some manifestly public, political ways, via 
corporate lobbying, discourses of the 'global race', continued dismantling of the 
welfare state and so on. But while the super-rich may benefit from such political 
agendas, it is questionable how active they are in supporting them.  
 
My reason for suggesting we focus on 'agency' (in the sense of principle-agent 
problem) is that this provides the template for exploring a different, micro-scale way 
in which the 'political' and the 'economic' become separated, in a way that the 
concept of 'neoliberalism' won't capture. As I've argued here, agency allows money 
to remain in its teleological vacuum, as pure possibility. It exploits the capacity of 
money to "obey us without reservation" (Simmel, 2004: 325). It is through operating 
via agents that the super-rich are able to avoid developing a public or political 
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identity, and money can retain its abstract and liquid character. In a sense, it is 
thanks to agents that the super-rich can happily avoid becoming a class-for-itself, just 
as it is thanks to agents that finance can avoid becoming anchored in any form of 
productive infrastructure.  
 
This is not necessarily to contradict accounts of neoliberalism as a class-based 
project such as Harvey's, but simply to specify the limits of Marxist and institutionalist 
accounts of the neoliberal state for understanding the super-rich. As a conscious, 
class-based project, neoliberalism required considerable solidarity and reflexive self-
understanding on the part of capitalists and ideologues themselves, through think 
tanks, lobbying bodies, political parties, philanthropic networks. As Streeck argues, 
what was unexpected about the neoliberal counter-revolution of the 1970s was that 
capital had the capacity to mobilise in a class-based fashion (Streeck, 2014). 
Corporations and capital owners discovered a common political agenda, which they 
pursued with a solidarity traditionally associated with labour and the Left.  
 
The super-rich may benefit from the politics of neoliberalism. But as private 
individuals, relying on money for the maximisation of their security, their access to 
elite spaces, their engagement with culture, their shared political agenda is not an 
explicit or express one. They may belong to a class-in-itself, but arguably it is not a 
class-for-itself. In the political conflicts between capital and labour, which the 
neoliberal state attempts to settle, the strategy of the super-rich is to become 
insulated from all conflict altogether. For Harvey, the enforcement of pro-capitalist 
public order is a key objective of the neoliberal state; the super-rich alternative is to 
retreat from such order, using private security and infrastructure. The principle-agent 
relation is an individualisation and privatisation of political interest, converting the use 
of symbolic and physical power into just another form of private contract.    
 
In a simple case of this relationship, one party is the 'principle' and another is the 
'agent'. For example, there is the individual shareholder who owns stock in a 
company, and the manager who runs the company to maximise dividends. Or there 
is the holder of some savings, and the private fund manager who looks after those 
savings. But in the messier reality of financialised capitalism, where there are chains 
of intermediaries and many activities within large banks which are unknown both to 
those banks' executives and to their shareholders, forms of delegation will be much 
more complex than this. The same individual or institution will be 'principle' in one set 
of relationships, and 'agent' in another. This is not one class contracting another 
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class to act on its behalf. Rather these are webs of contract and negotiation, between 
the super-rich.  
 
For those members of the traditional upper middle class who (as Dorling details) now 
find themselves excluded from economic growth, one of the easiest ways of entering 
the 1% or the 0.1% is not to seek out opportunities for exploitative relations, as Marx 
might have supposed. Rather it is to seek out new opportunities for mutually-
advantageous service, contract and negotiation with the super-rich. Becoming an 
expert on high value property, moving into private money management, establishing 
a new school, specialising in ultra-high value interior decorating - these are activities 
which, in London, propel university graduates to levels of income and wealth that the 
traditional professions no longer can.    
 
What this suggests is that super-rich studies need to recognise the importance of 
non-hierarchical, non-exploitative dyadic contractual relations, to the production and 
re-production of extreme wealth. The pairing of 'principle' and 'agent' is the critical 
relation and political-economic form. The critique of neoliberalism focuses often on 
how money pollutes politics and public life (e.g. Crouch, 2011). The critique of the 
super-rich might need to focus on the reverse, how wealth is kept entirely separate 
from politics and public life, through strategic acts of delegation, where the delegate 
is also a delegator.  
 
In many situations, this may come to light as a form of apparent corruption or low-
level fraud, as when professions such as accountancy become revealed as no less 
amenable to fee-chasing as anyone else, or CEOs are found to inflate their pay 
regardless of their performance. And yet, while these may attract ire on traditional 
liberal grounds (that the public is being harmed), these are entirely normal if viewed 
as principle-agent problems: unlike 'professionals', agents are assumed to be no less 
avaricious than the principles they contract with. Meanwhile, absenting capital from 
the evaluative public sphere is entirely the purpose of delegating power to agents. 
Part of what the contracted agent offers the principle is the ability to outsource moral 
accountability. Professional services firms command very large fees, in exchange for 
forms of moral under-writing - declaring that activities are transparent and trust-
worthy, sometimes when they are not. One of the capacities of money when 
combined with agents is to move blame around at high speed, through dense 
networks that are immune to public or political gaze. The greatest form of negative 
liberty is the freedom even from the consequences and truth of one's own actions. In 
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that sense, agents offer the owner of money the most euphoric nihilistic ideal: to be 
free not only from moral judgement, but also from one's own conscience.   
 
 
Sociological challenges 
 
The reason for conceiving the higher reaches of capitalism in terms of 'principle 
agent problems' is not intended as a concession to the methdological individualism of 
game theory or economistic theories of governance, although there is a risk of 
reinforcing these. It is rather an attempt, as per the study of economics' 
'performativity', to recognise that any social world is partly structured by the concepts 
and tools that are available to its inhabitants. Moreover, just as Simmel developed a 
sociology of money out of elements that were common to the marginalist economics 
of his time, perhaps we can develop a sociology of the super-rich by adopting 
elements of elites' own self-understanding.   
 
Returning to the new challenges to sociology posed by Savage, studying 
relationships and contracts of agency has various advantages. Firstly, it allows us to 
take money seriously, without imposing a Weberian theory of power or a Marxian 
theory of class upon it. In this paper, I suggested, following Simmel, that to value 
money as money is to revel in a teleological vacuum, in which all future possibilities 
are kept open as much as possible. It is to live in a state of arbitrariness, where 
money can be experienced as perfect liquidity, without friction. As an affective, moral 
or psychological disposition, this is the opposite of debt and guilt (which, as is often 
remarked on, share the same German word, Schuld). Where debt/guilt involve 
inescapable forms of control and relationship to the past, the super-rich seek an 
extreme form of negative liberty that lacks all normative restraint and relationship 
only to the future.  
 
But while a Simmelian approach to money may help to illuminate the liquid monetary 
fetishism of the super-rich, it is incomplete without some awareness of the institutions 
and relations which insulate this fantasy from public politics and culture. This would 
include the technological infrastructure (cables, data centres etc), while allows 
money to be virtually frictionless in its movements (MacKenzie, 2014). Then there 
are institutions which 'sell' national citizenship, supported by companies such as 
Henley and Partners (registered in Jersey, UK) which sell "citizenship solutions" to 
the super-rich (Milmo, 2014). Family offices, whose work includes removing all 
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inconveniences associated with the trans-national lifestyles of the super-rich, are 
another case worth exploring (Glucksberg, 2014). Other agency services - body 
guards, private tutors, private transport, specialist real estate agents, private 
telecommunications, specialist art dealers - all do important work in facilitating the 
micro-cosmic disembedding of super-rich elites from politics, public space and public 
culture.  
 
Secondly, the approach I am advocating here follows Savage's suggestion that we 
describe first, then explain (tentatively) second. This is especially important given the 
severe methodological problems posed to sociologists by the super-rich, where 
interview access and survey data are very hard to come by. Agents, of various kinds, 
serve like the tips of icebergs: they do not reveal what is below the surface, but they 
do at least confirm where the rest of the iceberg is located. Burrows has shown that 
agents can even be used as sources of quantitative data, if viewed inventively: 
Knight Frank estate agents, who broker a lot of very high value real estate in London, 
also serve as a source of data on where ultra-high-worth properties are located 
geographically (Burrows, 2013). 
 
Finally, there are a couple of other challenges posed by Savage. One is to correctly 
name or identify this 'class'. My argument would suggest that we should avoid the 
term 'class', at least in any Marxian sense of a socio-economic group which sits in 
relation to another group. While Dorling gives plenty of worrying evidence that the 
'1%' is effectively exploiting the whole of the rest of society, it is difficult to conceive 
of this as a class relation. If the super-rich has a politics at all, perhaps it is to avoid 
becoming a class, precisely so as to avoid having any embedded relationship to 
public, state, society or productive economy.  
 
The other challenge is how to account for the dynamics of openness and closure 
surrounding the super-rich. Clearly there are elements of competition involved here, 
and there are successful entrepreneurs and celebrities within this stratum. But by 
stressing the role of agency, we can understand this as neither an open competition, 
nor a closed aristocracy. Mills notes how corporations behave in a competitive-yet-
monopolistic fashion, neither quite in the market, nor outside it either. This is the 
essence of strategy, to position oneself in a competitive game where one is immune 
to competition. It is this that agents offer: a degree of closure from the competitive 
market, although still a form of closure that is available to buy.   
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